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Price controls are one of the most common 
forms of market intervention by regulatory 
authorities. Price setting was a central duty of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board until the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978. The Dairy Price 
Support Program sets a minimum price for milk 
and other dairy products in the United States. 
Price caps for pharmaceutical drugs are a perva-
sive form of government intervention in Europe. 
And minimum wage laws set a price floor for 
labor throughout the developed world.
A great deal of empirical work suggests that 
price controls induce quality-based competition 
between sellers.1 However, competitive equi-
libria often fail to exist when price controls are 
present, and hence theoretical analysis of the 
effects of price controls has proven difficult. In 
particular, this lack of a theoretical foundation 
1 See Plott (1965) for an analysis of nonprice competition 
by regulated dry cleaners, Douglas and Miller III (1974) for 
an analysis of nonprice competition by airlines, and Joskow 
(1980) for an analysis of nonprice competition by hospitals. 
Hashimoto (1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2001) inves-
tigate whether minimum wage laws affect job characteris-
tics, particularly on-the-job training. 
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undermines our ability to understand how price 
controls may induce changes in product quality.
As an example, consider the case where there 
are two sellers and one buyer, and two quali-
ties, H and L. The buyer has unit demand, and 
values a high quality good at 11, while valu-
ing the low quality good at 8. Each seller has 
unit supply, with the low cost seller having a 
cost of production of 1 for a low quality good 
and 6 for a high quality good, and the high cost 
seller having a cost of production of 2 for a 
low quality good and 7 for a high quality good. 
In any competitive equilibrium, the low cost 
seller sells to the buyer the low quality good 
at a price p(L) ∈ [1, 2], with the price of the (untraded) high quality good being in the inter-
val p(H ) ∈ [ p(L) + 3, p(L) + 5]. However, if a 
price floor of 5 is imposed for all qualities, then 
no competitive equilibrium exists, as both sell-
ers will demand to sell since the price of the low 
quality good is at least 5.
However, a stable outcome exists regardless 
of the existence of the price floor. In the case 
without the price floor, we know that any stable 
outcome induces the same allocation as the com-
petitive equilibrium (Hatfield et al. 2012). When 
the price floor of 5 is present, our Theorem 3 
demonstrates that in any stable outcome the 
low cost seller sells the high quality good to the 
buyer at a price in the interval [6, 7]. This exam-
ple demonstrates that a price floor may induce 
quality competition between sellers, and further-
more may reduce total social surplus.2
More generally, in this work we consider two-
sided markets with price controls as a special 
case of the two-sided matching with contracts 
model.3 Hatfield et al. (2012) showed that, when 
2 Indeed, in this example, all three agents are weakly 
worse off. 
3 Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) first developed the match-
ing with contracts model, building on the work of Kelso and 
Crawford (1982); the possibility of such a  generalization 
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price controls are not present, the set of com-
petitive equilibria naturally correspond to the 
set of stable outcomes. We develop a model of 
quality competition and show, using techniques 
developed by Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and 
Hatfield and Kominers (2012a, b), that the set of 
stable outcomes is nonempty even when price 
controls are imposed. Furthermore, the model 
exhibits quality-based competition induced by 
price controls: when a price floor is introduced, 
sellers compete by offering inefficiently high 
quality goods, while when a price ceiling is 
introduced, buyers compete by accepting inef-
ficiently low quality goods.
I. The Quality Competition Model
A. Framework
There is a finite set of unit demand buyers B, 
a finite set of unit supply sellers S, and a finite 
set of qualities Q, where the set Q is a finite set 
of consecutive integers { q min  , … ,  q max  }. The set 
of trades is defined as Ω ≡ B × S × Q. For 
each trade (b, s, q) = ω ∈ Ω, we let b(ω) ≡ b, 
s(ω) ≡ s, and q(ω) ≡ q. For a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω, we let  Ψ b ≡ {ψ ∈ Ψ : b = b(ψ)} for 
each b ∈ B and  Ψ s ≡ {ψ ∈ Ψ : s = s(ψ)} for 
each s ∈ S. A set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is feasible if 
each agent is associated with at most one trade, 
i.e., |  Ψ b | ≤ 1 for all b ∈ B and |  Ψ s | ≤ 1 for all 
s ∈ S.
The set of contracts is defined as X ≡ Ω × ℝ. 
For a contract x = (ω,  p ω ), we let b(x) ≡ b(ω), 
s(x) ≡ s(ω), q(x) ≡ q(ω), and p(x) ≡  p ω . We 
let  Y b ≡ { y ∈ Y : b = b(y)} for each b ∈ B and 
Y s ≡ { y ∈ Y : s = s(y)} for each s ∈ S. A set of 
contracts Y ⊆ X is an outcome if each agent 
is associated with at most one contract, i.e., |  Y b | ≤ 1 for all b ∈ B and |  Y s | ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S.
The utility for a feasible set of trades for a 
buyer b ∈ B is given by
 u b (Ψ) ≡ {    f b + v(q(ψ))   0    if ∃ ψ ∈  Ψ b otherwise,  
where  f b ∈ ℝ denotes the value b obtains from 
procuring a good, while v(q) is a  concave 
was first noted in remarks by Crawford and Knoer (1981) 
and Kelso and Crawford (1982). Klaus and Walzl (2009) 
and Hatfield and Kominers (2012) extended this work to the 
setting of many-to many matching with contracts. 
 function denoting the additional utility b 
obtains from procuring a good of quality q. 
This induces a utility function over feasible 
outcomes for b of
 U b (Y ) ≡ {    f b + v(q(y)) − p(y)  0    if ∃y ∈  Y b  otherwise. 
Similarly, the utility for a feasible set of trades 
for a seller s is given by
 u s (Ψ) ≡ {  − c s − e(q(ψ))   0    if ∃ψ ∈  Ψ s otherwise,  
where  c s ∈ ℝ denotes the cost s incurs from pro-
ducing a good, while e(q) is a convex function 
denoting the additional cost s incurs from pro-
ducing a good of quality q. This induces a utility 
function over feasible outcomes for s of
 U s (Y ) ≡ {  p(y) −  c s − e(q(y))   0    if ∃y ∈  Y s  otherwise. 
Finally, for simplicity, we assume that there 
is a unique quality   q <  q max  that maximizes 
the surplus v(q) − e(q); note that the assump-
tions on the utility function then imply that 
surplus is increasing with quality for all quali-
ties below   q, and decreasing with quality for all 
qualities above   q.
B. Efficiency and Equilibrium
An outcome A is efficient if it solves
A ∈  arg max 
Y⊆X
   ∑ 
i∈B∪S
 
 
   U i (Y ).
It is straightforward that for any efficient out-
come A, for each x ∈ A, q(x) =   q.
The utility function for each agent induces a 
choice correspondence
 C i (Y ) ≡  arg max 
Z⊆ Y i 
  U i (Z )
for each i ∈ B ∪ S.
We define an equilibrium as a stable outcome. 
An outcome A ⊆ X is stable if it is
 (i) Individually rational: for all i ∈ B ∪ S, 
A i ∈  C i (A).
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 (ii) Unblocked: there does not exist a non-
empty blocking set Z ⊆ X such that
  a)  Z ∩ A = ∅, and
  b)  for all i ∈ B ∪ S, if  Z i ≠ ∅, then 
 Z i ⊆  Y i for all  Y i ∈  C i (Z ∪ A).
Stability is closely related to the idea of com-
petitive equilibrium: Intuitively, for an alloca-
tion A to be unblocked, for each contract x ∉ A, 
it must be the case that either b(x) or s(x) rejects 
x. If so, for each agent i we can consider his 
“budget set” as the union of  A i and the set of 
contracts he rejects. Hence, stability insists that 
each agent chooses optimally from this “budget 
set,” which is analogous to the notion of individ-
ual maximization from competitive equilibrium. 
Furthermore, market clearing is satisfied, as a 
contract x is demanded by the buyer b(x) if and 
only if it is demanded by the seller s(x). Hatfield 
et al. (2012) make this notion precise, showing 
that a natural correspondence between competi-
tive equilibria and stable outcomes exists in our 
setting when no price controls are imposed.
Furthermore, in this setting the set of stable 
outcomes is equivalent to the core. This equiva-
lence no longer holds in settings with multiunit 
supply sellers and multiunit demand buyers.
C. Equilibria of the Quality  
Competition Model
We begin by considering the case where only 
contracts in X(q) ≡ {x ∈ X : q(x) = q} are avail-
able, but no price controls are present. In that 
case, A is a stable outcome if and only if
(1) A ∈  arg max 
Y⊆X(q)
   ∑ 
i∈B∪S
 
 
   U i (Y );
that is, A maximizes surplus given the contrac-
tual set available.
Furthermore, every contract will trade at the 
same price p. The price p must be no less than
  p B min  (q) ≡  max  
b∈B∖b(Y )  f b + v(q)
so that each buyer with unmet demand does not 
wish to buy a good, and
  p S min  (q) ≡  max 
s∈s(Y )  c s + e(q)
so that each seller currently engaged 
in trade wishes to do so; we let  p min  (q) ≡ max{  p B min  (q),  p S min  (q)}. Analogously, the price 
p must be no greater than
  p B max  (q) ≡  min 
b∈b(Y )  f b + v(q)
so that each buyer currently engaged in trade 
wishes to do so, and
  p S max  (q) ≡  min  
s∈S∖s(Y )  c s + e(q)
so that each seller not currently producing 
does not wish to supply a good; we let  p max  (q) ≡ min{  p B max  (q),  p S max  (q)}.
We formalize these results in Theorem 1; 
proofs of this and other stated results are a 
special case of results found in Hatfield et al. (2011).
THEOREM 1: For the contractual set X(q), 
there exists at least one stable outcome A; for 
any such A, (1) holds and moreover for each 
x ∈ A, p(x) ∈ [  p min (q),  p max (q)].
It is now straightforward to characterize the 
set of equilibria for the contractual set X.
THEOREM 2: For the contractual set X, the set 
of stable outcomes is the same as that given in 
theorem 1 for the quality   q.
Hence, in the absence of price controls, any 
stable outcome will be efficient. In particular, 
only the efficient quality will trade. To see this, 
suppose that y ∈ A for some outcome A and that 
q(y) ≠   q. Now consider x such that b(x) = b(y), 
s(x) = s(y), q(x) =   q, and
 p(x) = p(y) + (v(  q) − v(q( y ))) − ϵ
for some small ϵ > 0. Then {x} is a blocking set, 
as x will clearly be chosen by b(x), and also by 
s(x) since
 v(  q) − v(q(y )) − ϵ > c(  q) − c(q(y))
for ϵ sufficiently small, as   q is the unique effi-
cient quality.
We now consider the case where a price floor 
of  p f is imposed; that is, the set of contracts is 
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given by X[  p f ] ≡ {x ∈ X : p(x) ≥  p f }. In this 
case, stable outcomes may no longer be efficient, 
as the supply of goods of quality   q exceeds the 
demand. Hence, quality may adjust upward to 
compensate. When the price floor is just above 
p max  (  q), trade of both the efficient quality   q and 
the inefficient quality   q + 1 may be observed; 
the efficient quality good will trade at the price 
floor  p f , while   q + 1 quality goods will trade 
at  p f + (v(  q + 1) − v(  q)). Trades of the inef-
ficiently high quality good are not blocked 
at this price, as any blocking contract would 
have a price lower than the price floor. Finally, 
as the price floor  p f rises above  p max  (  q + 1) − (v(  q + 1) − v(  q)), we reach another tipping 
point, as all trade at the efficient quality ceases. 
At such high price floors, sellers compete away 
the gains from trading the efficient quality good 
by offering buyers more attractive contracts for 
the inefficient quality good; hence, only qual-
ity   q + 1 goods will be traded in equilibrium.
THEOREM 3: Consider the contractual set 
X[  p f ]. A stable outcome exists. there are three 
cases:
 (i)  p f <  p min  (  q) : then any stable outcome 
is as in theorem 2.
 (ii)  p max  (  q) <  p f <  p min  (  q + 1) − [v(  q + 
1) − v(  q)] : then in any stable outcome 
A, for each x ∈ A either
  • q(x) =   q and p(x) =  p f , or
  •   q(x) =   q + 1 and p(x) =   p f + (v(  q + 1) − v(  q)),
  and the set of buyers engaging in trade is 
an element of
  arg max 
  B ⊆B
 {  ∑ 
b∈  B 
 
  (   f b + v(  q) −  p f )} .
 (iii)  p max  (  q + 1) − [v(  q + 1) − v(  q)] <  p f <  p min  (  q + 1) : Then any stable out-
come is as in Theorem 1 for the contract 
set X(  q + 1).
Price floors induce inefficiency in three ways: 
First, there is too little trade, since some welfare 
enhancing trades require a price below the price 
floor to be individually rational. Second, trade 
may be at an inefficient quality, since a mutually 
advantageous switch to a more efficient quality 
requires the price to drop below the price floor. 
Finally, the wrong agents may trade, as supply is 
greater than demand; a more efficient producer 
can not undercut a less efficient producer on 
price if the price is already at the price floor.4
II. Conclusion
The model presented here makes specific 
predictions of market equilibrium in settings 
with price controls. The results of our earlier 
work Hatfield, Plott, and Tanaka (2011) gen-
eralize the results here to the case of multiunit 
demand. Moreover, in that work, we report on 
a series of experiments of continuous time, 
double auction markets with multiple qualities; 
for each experiment, we impose a price control 
that corresponds to either part (ii) or part (iii) 
of Theorem 3. The experimental results are very 
close to the predictions of the theory: When the 
price floor falls within the regime of part (ii) of 
Theorem 3, agents trade both qualities, with the 
efficient quality good being traded at the price 
floor and the inefficiently high quality good 
being traded at a price reflecting a buyer’s dif-
ference in valuation between the two qualities. 
When the price floor is higher, and falls within 
the regime of part (iii) of Theorem 3, agents 
trade only the high quality good and do so at 
a price as if that quality were the only quality 
available. Furthermore, in both cases, the quan-
tity traded falls within the interval predicted 
by Theorem 3. Analogous results are obtained 
when price ceilings are imposed.
Stability is a robust solution concept which 
generalizes the concept of competitive equilib-
rium in settings with transferable utility. In this 
work, we show that stable outcomes exist even 
in settings with price controls, while competi-
tive equilibria do not. This suggests that stabil-
ity may be helpful in understanding the effects 
of other market interventions. For instance, in 
settings with quotas (such as import restrictions 
on certain goods), competitive equilibria fail to 
exist; however, stable outcomes do exist in such 
settings, and, hence, matching theory allows us 
4 The results of this theorem can be extended to any price 
floor, as well as to price ceilings. See Hatfield, Plott, and 
Tanaka (2011). 
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to make sharp predictions.5 We conjecture that 
there may be other settings where stability pro-
vides sharp equilibrium predictions even though 
competitive equilibria fail to exist.
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